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In the last five years, the global economy has experienced severe bouts of financial instability that have had devastating impacts on crisis countries such as Mexico (in which GDP growth fell from above 4 percent in 1994 before the crisis to negative 6 percent in 1995) and in Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea and Indonesia (in which GDP growth fell from above 5 percent in 1996 before the crisis to below -5 percent in 1998, see Table 1 ). These swings of GDP growth of over 10 percent are on the order of magnitude to what occurred in the United States during the Great Depression.
Two of the key questions facing policymakers today are how to reduce the risk of global financial stability, and how to cope with it when it occurs. This paper starts by defining financial instability and then showing how it harms economic activity. It then uses this framework to describe what happened during the recent financial crises in Mexico and east Asia. The paper ends by raising several key policy issues; not coincidentally, these issues are addressed in the remaining papers in the symposium.
What Is Financial Instability?
Financial markets perform the essential function of channeling funds to those individuals or firms that have productive investment opportunities. If the financial system does not perform this role away from making loans at high interest rates, because they know that they are not fully informed about the quality of borrowers, and they fear that someone willing to borrow at a high interest rate is more likely to be a low-quality borrower who is less likely to repay the loan. Lenders will try to tackle the problem of asymmetric information by screening out good from bad credit risks. But this process is inevitably imperfect, and fear of adverse selection will lead lenders to reduce the quantity of loans they might otherwise make.
Moral hazard occurs after the transaction takes place. It occurs because a borrower has incentives to invest in projects with high risk in which the borrower does well if the project succeeds, but the lender bears most of the loss if the project fails. A borrower also has incentives to misallocate funds for personal use, to shirk and not work very hard, and to undertake investment in unprofitable projects that serve only to increase personal power or stature.
Thus, a lender subjected to the hazard that the borrower has incentives to engage in activities that are undesirable from the lender's point of view: that is, activities that make it less likely that the loan will be paid back. Lenders do often impose restrictions (restrictive covenants) on borrowers so that borrowers do not engage in behavior that makes it less likely that they can pay back the loan. However, such restrictions are costly to enforce and monitor, and inevitably somewhat limited in their reach. The potential conflict of interest between the borrower and lender stemming from moral hazard again implies that many lenders will lend less than they otherwise would, so that lending and investment will be at suboptimal levels.
In the last 20 years, a growing literature has sought to explain the institutional structure of financial markets by recognizing that this structure has evolved to reduce the asymmetric information problems of adverse selection and moral hazard (Gertler, 1988 and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1998) . Of course, addressing the problems of asymmetric information is not a one-time event, but rather an ongoing problem whose dimensions shift with each twist and turn of the economy. From this perspective, the underlying rationale for financial intermediaries (commercial banks, thrift institutions, finance companies, insurance companies, mutual funds and pension funds), of which banks are the most important, is that they have both the ability and the economic incentive to address asymmetric information problems. For example, banks have an obvious ability to collect information at the time they consider making a loan, and this ability is only increased when banks engage in long-term customer relationships and line of credit arrangements. Focusing on information problems leads to a definition of financial instability: Financial instability occurs when shocks to the financial system interfere with information flows so that the financial system can no longer do its job of channeling funds to those with productive investment opportunities. Indeed, if the financial instability is severe enough, it can lead to almost a complete breakdown in the functioning of financial markets, a situation which is then classified as a financial crisis.
Why Financial Instability Occurs
Financial intermediaries, and particularly banks, have a very important role in financial markets since they are well suited to engage in information-producing activities that facilitate productive investment for the economy. Thus, a decline in the ability of these institutions to engage in financial intermediation and to make loans will lead directly to a decline in investment and aggregate economic activity. When shocks to the financial system make adverse selection and moral hazard problems worse, then lending tends to dry up ---even for many of those with productive investment opportunities, since it has become harder to distinguish them from potential borrowers who do not have good opportunities. 
Increases in Interest Rates
Asymmetric information and the resulting adverse selection problem can lead to "credit rationing," in which some borrowers are denied loans even when they are willing to pay a higher interest rate (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) . This occurs because as interest rates rise, prudent borrowers are more likely to decide that it would be unwise to borrow, while borrowers with the riskiest investment projects are often those who are willing to pay the highest interest rates, since if the high-risk investment succeeds, they will be the main beneficiaries.
In this setting, a higher interest rate leads to even greater adverse selection; that is, the higher interest rate increases the likelihood that the lender is lending to a bad credit risk. Thus, higher interest rates can be one factor that helps precipitate financial instability, because lenders recognize that higher interest rates mean a dilution in the quality of potential borrowers, and are likely to react by taking a step back from their business of financial intermediation and limiting the number of loans they make.
Increases in interest rates can also have a negative effect on bank balance sheets. The traditional banking business involves "borrowing short and lending long;" that is, taking deposits which can be withdrawn on demand (or certificates of deposit that can be withdrawn in a matter of months) and making loans that will be repaid over periods of years or sometimes even decades. In short, the assets of a bank typically have longer duration assets than its liabilities. Thus, a rise in interest rates directly causes a decline in net worth, because in present value terms, the interestrate rise lowers the value of assets with their longer duration more than it raises the value of liabilities with their shorter duration.
Increases in Uncertainty
A dramatic increase in uncertainty in financial markets makes it harder for lenders to screen out good from bad credit risks. The lessened ability of lenders to solve adverse selection and moral hazard problems renders them less willing to lend, leading to a decline in lending, investment, and aggregate activity. This increase in uncertainty can stem from a failure of a prominent financial or nonfinancial institution, or from a recession, or from uncertainty about the future direction of government policies.
Deterioration of Nonfinancial Balance Sheets
The state of the balance sheet of nonfinancial firms is the most critical factor for the severity of asymmetric information problems in the financial system. If there is a widespread deterioration of balance sheets among borrowers, it worsens both adverse selection and moral hazard problems in financial markets, thus promoting financial instability. This problem can arise in a variety of ways.
For example, lenders often use collateral as an important way of addressing asymmetric information problems. Collateral reduces the consequences of adverse selection or moral hazard because it reduces the lender's losses in the case of a default. If a borrower defaults on a loan, the lender can sell the collateral to make up for at least some of the losses on the loan. But if asset prices in an economy fall, and the value of collateral falls as well, then the problems of asymmetric information suddenly rear their heads.
Net worth can perform a similar role to collateral. If a firm has high net worth, then even if it defaults on its debt payments, the lender can take title to the firm's net worth, sell it off, and use the proceeds to recoup some of the losses from the loan. High net worth also directly decreases the incentives for borrowers to commit moral hazard because borrowers now have more at stake, and thus more to lose, if they default on their loans. The importance of net worth explains why stock market crashes can cause financial instability. A sharp decline in the stock market reduces the market valuation of a firms' net worth, and thus can increase adverse selection and moral hazard problems in financial markets (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1988; Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Calomiris and Hubbard, 1990) . Since the stock market decline which reduces net worth increases incentives for borrowers to engage in moral hazard, and since lenders are now less protected against the consequences of adverse selection because the value of net assets is worth less, lending decreases and economic activity declines.
Increases in interest rates not only have a direct effect on
increasing adverse selection problems, as described a moment ago, but they may also promote financial instability through both firms'
and households' balance sheets.
A rise in interest rates will increased households' and firms' interest payments, decrease cash flow and thus cause a deterioration in their balance sheets, as pointed out in Bernanke and Gertler's (1995) by an outright deflation as has occurred in Japan more recently, the value of firms' liabilities in real terms rises, and its net worth in real terms declines. The reduction in net worth then increases the adverse selection and moral hazard problems facing lenders, and reduces investment and economic activity.
In emerging market economies, a decline in unanticipated inflation does not have the unfavorable direct effect on firms' balance sheets that it has in industrialized countries. Debt contracts are of very short duration in many emerging market countries, and since the terms of debt contracts are continually repriced to reflect expectations of inflation, unexpected inflation has little real effect. Thus, one mechanism that has played a role in industrialized countries to promote financial instability has no role in many emerging market countries.
On the other hand, emerging market economies face at least one factor affecting balance sheets that can be extremely important in precipitating financial instability that is not important in most This paper does not examine two other recent crises, those in Brazil and Russia. Russia's financial crisis in 1998 can also be explained with the asymmetric information story here, but it is more appropriate to view it as a symptom of a wider breakdown in the economy --and discussing the myriad problems of the Russian economy would take us too far afield. The Brazilian crisis differs in that it has features of a more traditional balance of payments crisis, in which fiscal policy plays a prominent role, rather than a financial crisis. The paper also does not examine what is happening in Japan. Japan has also been experiencing financial instability with a banking crisis that is having serious negative impact on the economy. The asymmetric information framework can also illuminate the stagnation in Japan, but because Japan has not entered a fullfledged financial crisis, it is not discussed here. However, see Mishkin (forthcoming). The Chilean financial crisis of 1982 also is well-explained by the asymmetric information framework outlined here and is discussed in Diaz-Alejandro (1985) . Surveys of the basic facts in the Mexican and East Asian crises can be found in Mishkin (1996 Mishkin ( , 1999 , Goldstein (1998) , Radelet and Sachs (1998 ), Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998 ), World Bank (1998 ), and Kamin (1999 .
suggest that inappropriate fiscal policy was not the source of the currency or financial crises in these countries.
2. At the onset of the crises, inflation was relatively low in all the crisis countries. In 1994, Mexican inflation was below 10 percent, and had declined substantially from previous levels.
Similarly, as we can see in Table 2 , right before the crisis, inflation rates in East Asia were below 10 percent and were sometimes below 5 percent.
These first two facts suggests that monetary and fiscal policy were in general quite reasonable in these countries before the crises. 4. The crisis countries, for the most part, were experiencing large current account deficits. In 1994, Mexico had a current account deficit (the difference between exports and imports of goods and services) of 7 percent of GDP. In 1996, the east Asian crisis countries of Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and South Korea had current account deficits between 3 percent and 5 percent of GDP, while Thailand was running a deficit of 8 percent of GDP. These large current account deficits are likely to have played some role in the subsequent crises these countries experienced.
5. Capital inflows into the crisis countries were very high before the crisis and turned around rapidly at the outset of the crisis. As Table 2 indicates, capital inflows relative to GDP were very high in all the crisis countries before the crisis, ranging from 5 percent to 14 percent of GDP. When the crises occurred, capital flows underwent a huge reversal and started flowing outward.
Whether the capital outflows were a cause or a symptom of the financial crises in these countries is an important question. Thailand, the growth in lending was far higher for finance companies and other nonbank financial institutions than it was for banks.
Lending booms thus look like they could have been an important factor causing problems in the financial sector, which is consistent with the evidence in Gavin and Hausman (1996) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) who find in general that lending booms are an important predictor of banking crises.
7. Deterioration in bank balance sheets occurred before the crises in all crisis countries. At the onset of the crises, nonperforming loans as a percentage of total bank loans was already high in all the crisis countries. Table 2 Of course, the problem was not that lending expanded, but rather that it expanded so rapidly that excessive risk-taking was the result. This excessive risk-taking occurred for two reasons.
First, banks and other financial institutions lacked the welltrained loan officers, risk-assessment systems, and other management expertise to evaluate and respond to risk appropriately. This problem was made even more severe by the rapid credit growth in a lending boom which stretched the resources of the bank supervisors.
They failed to screen and monitor these new loans appropriately.
Second, Mexico and the crisis countries in east Asia were notorious for weak financial regulation and supervision.
(In contrast, the noncrisis countries in east Asia, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan had very strong prudential supervision.) When financial liberalization yielded new opportunities to take on risk, these weak regulatory/supervisory systems could not limit the moral hazard created by the government safety net, and excessive risk-taking was one result. Even as government failed in supervising banks, it was effectively offering an implicit safety net that banks would not be allowed to go broke, and thus reassuring depositors and foreign lenders that they did not need to monitor these banks, since there were likely to be government bailouts to protect them.
A dangerous dynamic emerged. Once financial liberalization was adopted, foreign capital flew into banks in these emerging market countries because they paid high yields in order to attract funds to rapidly increase their lending, and because such investments were viewed as likely to be protected by a government safety net, either from the government of the emerging market country or from international agencies such as the IMF. The capital inflow problem was further stimulated by government policies of keeping exchange rates pegged to the dollar, which probably gave foreign investors a sense of lower risk. Indeed, one lesson that emerges from the financial crises of the last few years is that pegging exchange rates has a hidden cost because it may encourage excessive risktaking and capital inflows (Mishkin, 1998) As we have seen, an increase in uncertainty and a decrease in net worth as a result of a stock market decline increase asymmetric information problems. It became harder to screen out good from bad borrowers, and the decline in net worth decreased the value of firms' collateral and increased their incentives to make risky investments because there is less equity to lose if the investments are unsuccessful. The increase in uncertainty and stock market declines that occurred before the crisis, along with the deterioration in banks' balance sheets, worsened adverse selection and moral hazard problems and made the economies ripe for a serious financial crisis.
In an industrialized countries, when a financial crises occurs and the financial system threatens to seize up, domestic central banks can address matters with expansionary monetary policy to make credit more broadly available and with a lender of last resort operation to limit the degree of instability in the banking system. The first mechanism involved the direct effect of currency devaluation on the balance sheets of firms. As discussed earlier, the devaluations in Mexico and East Asia increased the debt burden of domestic firms which were denominated in foreign currencies. This mechanism was particularly strong in Indonesia, the worst hit of all the crisis countries, which saw the value of its currency decline by over 75 percent, thus increasing the rupiah value of foreign-denominated debts by a factor of four. Even a healthy firm is likely to be driven into insolvency by such a shock if it had a significant amount of foreign-denominated debt.
A second mechanism linking the financial crisis and the currency crisis arose because the devaluation of the domestic currency led to further deterioration in the balance sheets of the banking sector, provoking a large-scale banking crisis. In Mexico and the east Asian countries, banks had many liabilities denominated in foreign currency which increased sharply in value when a depreciation occurs. On the other hand, the problems of firms and households meant that they were unable to pay off their debts, also resulting in loan losses on the assets side of the banks' balance sheets. The result is that banks' balance sheets were squeezed from both the assets and liabilities side. Moreover, many of the banks' foreign-currency denominated debt was very short-term, so that the sharp increase in the value of this debt led to liquidity problems for the banks because this debt needed to be paid back quickly. The result of the further deterioration in bank balance sheets and their weakened capital base is that they cut back lending. In the case of Indonesia, these forces were severe enough to cause a banking panic in which numerous banks were forced to go out of business.
The third mechanism linking currency crises with financial crises in emerging market countries is that the devaluation can lead All three of these mechanisms indicate that the currency crisis caused a sharp deterioration in both financial and non-financial firm balance sheets in the crisis countries, which then translated to a contraction in lending and a severe economic downturn.
Financial markets were then no longer able to channel funds to those with productive investment opportunities, which led to devastating effects on the economies of these countries.
Policy Issues
Promoting safety and soundness of the financial system is crucial to preventing future financial instability. When a financial crisis does occur, the financial system needs to be restarted so that it can resume its job of channeling funds to those with productive investment opportunities. But what policy measures might governments adopt either to limit the risk of future financial crises or to cope with them after they arise? At the international level, there is the question of how an international institution might help cope with these crises, and prevent them from spreading.
At the domestic level, a government might reform the regulation and supervision of its banking system to reduce the risk of lending that disregards prudent risks. Finally, various proposals have been made to slow down the flow of international capital movements, and thus prevent the extreme swings between inflows and outflows that contributed to the financial crises in Mexico and east Asia. The other three papers in the symposium take on these topics in turn, so here I will say only a few words about each.
Central banks in emerging market countries have only a very limited ability to extricate their countries from a financial crisis. As discussed earlier, if they attempt to use expansionary monetary policy to make credit more available, or employ a lenderof-last-resort policy, the risk is that they will set off currency depreciation, and possibly higher interest rates becaue of increases in expectations of future inflation, both of which will make matters worse. However, liquidity provided from foreign sources does not lead to these undesirable consequences, and it helps to stabilize the value of the domestic currency which strengthens domestic balance sheets. Moreover, an international lender of last resort may be able to prevent contagion, in which a successful speculative attack on one emerging market currencies leads to attacks on other emerging market currencies, spreading financial and economic disruption as it goes. Since a lender of last resort for emerging market countries is needed at times, and since it cannot be provided domestically, there is a strong rationale for an international institution to fill this role. Research.
